William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3

Article 7

2003

Landlord/Tenant Law—Code Violations under
Negligence Per Se and Common Law Negligence
Theories: Gradjelick v. Hance
Francis J. Connolly

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Connolly, Francis J. (2003) "Landlord/Tenant Law—Code Violations under Negligence Per Se and Common Law Negligence
Theories: Gradjelick v. Hance," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 29: Iss. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Connolly: Landlord/Tenant Law—Code Violations under Negligence Per Se and C
CONNOLLY FORMATTED.DOC

2/7/2003 2:40 PM

LANDLORD / TENANT LAW—CODE VIOLATIONS
UNDER NEGLIGENCE PER SE AND COMMON LAW
NEGLIGENCE THEORIES: GRADJELICK V. HANCE
The Honorable Francis J. Connolly†
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................1013
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................1014
III. THE GRADJELICK CASE ........................................................1017
A. The Facts ....................................................................1017
B. The District Court’s Analysis.........................................1020
C. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis......................................1022
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION ....................1023
V. ANALYSIS OF THE GRADJELICK DECISION .............................1025
VI. CONCLUSION .....................................................................1027
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently clarified what
negligence claims are available to an injured tenant against a
landlord. A tenant may now pursue a claim against a landlord
under both negligence per se and common law negligence theories
1
when he or she alleges housing code violations. Previously, if an
accident occurred as a result of a housing code violation, a
landlord could rely upon an official housing inspection report that
did not reveal any violations to argue a lack of constructive notice
2
of the condition. The landlord’s lack of constructive knowledge
allowed the landlord to avoid liability under both theories for
injuries resulting from fire or housing code violations if the

† J.D. 1984, Georgetown University Law School. Judge Connolly was
appointed to the Fourth Judicial District bench in 1998 and elected to a full term
in 2000. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Nancy Ball, J.D. 2001,
William Mitchell College of Law, for all the hard work she has done in helping the
author write this article.
1. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 232 (Minn. 2002).
2. Id. at 234.
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landlord relied upon the official inspector’s report.
In Gradjelick v. Hance, a fire destroyed an apartment building
and tenants brought a negligence action against the landlord based
upon alleged housing code violations and common law
4
negligence. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in the case
now requires courts to conduct separate analyses under both
negligence per se and common law negligence theories to
determine landlord liability when a housing code violation is
5
alleged. The practical effect of the decision could impose a duty
upon landlords to re-inspect the premises, even if a building
inspector or fire marshal had previously conducted an inspection
and had found no code violations. The decision also ensures that
landlords cannot avoid liability for a dangerous condition on the
premises that they may have created.
II. BACKGROUND
The general rule under Minnesota common law is that a
landlord is not liable (owes no legal duty of care) to a tenant for
damage caused by defective conditions existing on the premises at
6
the time of the lease. Courts recognize four exceptions to the
7
general rule. The continuing evolution of these exceptions has
some arguing that the breadth of the exceptions has contributed to
the “erosion of the entire common-law rule, as part of the decline
8
of the concept of a lease as a conveyance . . . .”
The first exception applies where there is a hidden and
3. Id.
4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 234.
6. Johnson v. O’Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 504-06, 105 N.W.2d 244, 246-47
(1960); Briemhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 417, 35 N.W.2d 719, 726 (1949);
Oakland v. Stenlund, 420 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Broughton v.
Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), petition for rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 14, 1986). “The rule was rationalized by the theory that a lease is a
conveyance, a sale for the term, to which caveat emptor applied.” M ILTON R.
FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, § 10.101, at 607 (4th ed. 1997).
7. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 135. See also Oakland, 420 N.W.2d at 248.
8. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 10.101, at 610. Friedman also states that the
basic rule is “under assault led by an emerging ‘poverty law,’ which gives indication
of spreading into the entire field of lease law.” Id. The rule initially began from a
lease of agricultural land in which the landlord was absent and the tenant was the
only one on the land. Id. Since tenants are now often in short-term leases in nonagricultural buildings, the tenant is not the sole tenant and cannot afford to repair
the premises. Id. Now, neither the tenant nor the landlord expects the tenant to
repair the premises, despite a written lease to the contrary. Id.
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dangerous condition on the premises. This exception imposes a
duty of care on the landlord when the landlord is aware, or should
be aware, of the hidden and dangerous condition, but the tenant
9
remains unaware. The landlord need not have actual knowledge
of the condition. Instead, if he or she should have known of the
danger and a tenant exercising due care would not have discovered
10
it, then the landlord may be held liable.
A landlord is not
responsible, however, if the tenant is made aware of the dangerous
11
and defective condition. Second, courts may impose liability on
12
landlords for what is referred to as the common area exception.
This exception states that the landlord owes a duty to see that the
premises remaining in the control of the landlord are maintained
13
in a safe condition for the tenant’s use. A third exception exists if
the landlord leases the premises for purposes involving admission
14
to the public. If so, then the landlord is liable for any defective
15
conditions. Finally, an exception exists for any negligent repairs
9. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 135. Some of these exceptions also originated
with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343,which states that:
[A] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
his invitees by a condition on the land, if, but only if, he (a) knows or
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to
exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). The Restatement further states
what the tenant may expect from the landlord.
[A]n invitee enters upon an implied representation or assurance that
the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception.
He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will exercise
reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry, or for his use for
the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled to expect such care not
only in the original construction of the premises, and any activities of
the possessor or his employees which may affect their condition, but
also in inspection to discover their actual condition and any latent
defects, followed by such repair, safeguards or warning as may be
reasonably necessary for his protection under the circumstances.
Id. at §343, cmt. b.
10. Johnson, 258 Minn. at 504-06, 105 N.W.2d at 246.
11. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 136.
12. Nubbe v. Hardy Cont’l Hotel Sys. of Minn., 225 Minn. 496, 499, 31
N.W.2d 332, 334 (1948) (discussing landlord liability for the failure to maintain
areas of common use).
13. Id. See also Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 231.
14. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 136.
15. Id. at 135.
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16

that the landlord performed on the premises.
If any of these four exceptions to the general common law rule
apply, a landlord may be liable to a tenant for damage caused as a
17
result of a violation of a duty created under these exceptions. The
Minnesota Supreme Court found the first two exceptions, for
hidden and dangerous conditions and common areas, most
18
applicable in the Gradjelick case.
Even if an exception to the general rule of landlord liability
does not apply, the applicable statute or ordinance imposes a fixed
duty of care, so its breach constitutes conclusive evidence of
19
negligence. Prior to the supreme court’s 2002 ruling, if there was
an alleged violation of a housing or fire code, the case was typically
decided under a negligence per se analysis “if the persons harmed
by the violation were within the intended protection of the code
and if the harm suffered was of the type the code was intended to
20
prevent.”
Under the negligence per se analysis, Minnesota
requires four elements be present:
(1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of
the code violation;
(2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps
to remedy the violation;
(3) the injury suffered was the kind the Code was meant
to prevent; and
(4) the violation
was the proximate cause of the injury or
21
damage.
The district court in Gradjelick applied the negligence per se
analysis as articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bills v.
22
Willow Run I Apartments.
In Bills, the plaintiff was injured when he fell on an exterior
23
landing outside his apartment building. The plaintiff sued the
building owner alleging the handrails were in violation of the
Uniform Building Code and this violation was a proximate cause of

16. Id.
17. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 232 n.4.
18. Id. at 231.
19. Id. (citing Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995)). See
also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558-59 (Minn.
1977).
20. Alderman’s, 536 N.W.2d at 8.
21. Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1996).
22. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 234.
23. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 693-94.
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24

his injuries. A building inspector had inspected the landing prior
to the accident, and did not report any violations, which led the
district court to rule that the plaintiff had failed to show that the
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged
25
defective condition. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded
that landlords lack actual notice of a code violation when they
reasonably rely on an inspection report and, therefore, cannot be
held negligent per se for code violations that the inspector did not
26
include in his report.
The Bills decision was one of several that limited instances of
landlord liability. The courts have narrowly interpreted negligence
theories as they relate to landlord liability and the duties owed to a
tenant. In Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., the court found that no
special relationship existed between a landlord and tenant that
would give rise to a duty to protect the tenant from the criminal
27
acts of third parties. The court of appeals had earlier stated that
at common law, absent fraud, misrepresentation or an agreement
to the contrary, “a landlord was not responsible to his tenant for
28
injuries resulting from a defective condition on the premises.” In
fact, Minnesota law does not permit the imposition of strict liability
against a landlord for a breach of the implied warranty of
29
habitability.
Thus, Minnesota courts have generally taken a
narrow approach to landlord liability in numerous contexts.
III. THE GRADJELICK CASE
A. The Facts
In 1982, Leland Hance purchased a mixed-use building in
30
Excelsior, Minnesota. During the period relevant to this case, a
hardware store occupied the first floor of the apartment complex

24. Id. at 694.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 695.
27. 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 2001). See generally Melissa Baer, Notes and
Trends Real Property, Bench & Bar Minn. 34, 42 (Nov. 2001).
28. Meyer v. Parkin, 350 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (referencing
Normandine v. Friedson, 181 Minn. 471, 474, 233 N.W. 14, 15 (1930), which was
overruled in part by Johnson v. O’Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 507, 105 N.W.2d 244
(1960)); LOUIS LEHR, PREMISES LIABILITY 3D PART II. CHAPTER 41 (2002).
29. M INN. STAT. § 504B.161; LEHR, supra note 28.
30. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. 2002)
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31

and nine residential apartments were located on the second floor.
Leland and Patricia Hance, who owned the building, lived in
32
Colorado and employed a manager to care for the property. The
Gradjelicks and Connie Jo Klosterman were tenants in the building
and occupied two separate units located directly across a common
33
hallway from each other.
On April 24, 1999, Ms. Klosterman worked late and stopped at
a bar on her way home where she consumed several alcoholic
34
drinks. After leaving the bar, she returned to her building and
attended a party in a nearby apartment, where she consumed
35
several more drinks. Ms. Klosterman eventually left the party and
36
returned to her apartment. Early in the morning of April 25,
1999, Ms. Klosterman discovered a fire inside her apartment and
37
she fled the building.
The Gradjelicks awoke to the smell of smoke in their
38
apartment. Mrs. Gradjelick called 911, opened her bedroom
39
window and waited for firefighters to arrive at the scene. Upon
the arrival of the fire department, Mrs. Gradjelick escaped from the
40
apartment first, by means of a rescue ladder. After watching his
wife reach the ground safely, Mr. Gradjelick felt intense heat on his
41
back and fell from the second floor window. He suffered a
compound fracture of his leg and first degree burns to his back and
42
legs. At the time of trial, his medical bills were in excess of
43
$250,000 and the injuries affected his ability to work.
A deputy state fire marshal concluded that the fire originated
in Ms. Klosterman’s apartment on the sofa/sleeper where she had
44
apparently fallen asleep while smoking. It was later determined
that Ms. Klosterman’s blood alcohol concentration level was 0.34
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 4 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn.,
Sept. 18, 2000).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 228.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 5 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn.,
Sept. 18, 2000).
44. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 228.
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and she was subsequently charged with negligent fire, a felony in
45
Minnesota. The resulting property damage to the apartment
46
building was assessed at approximately $700,000.
The Gradjelicks brought a negligence claim against both Mr.
47
and Mrs. Hance and Ms. Klosterman. The claim against the
Hances, as owners of the building, alleged that they had
maintained the building in a negligent and careless manner and
that their negligence, along with Ms. Klosterman’s actions,
48
proximately caused Mr. Gradjelick’s injuries.
Plaintiffs also alleged numerous violations of the fire and
building code within the apartment building which had created
49
dangerous conditions.
Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants failed to create a secure hallway during the conversion
50
from commercial space to residential units. Experts hired by
Plaintiffs and Defendant Klosterman noted several code violations,
and both experts concluded that, but for the violations, the fire
51
could have been contained to Ms. Klosterman’s apartment.
Plaintiffs, based on evidence obtained during discovery,
argued that Defendants were aware of the unsafe conditions
52
because they had performed repairs on the property. The
Gradjelicks argued that the Hances should have known about the
conditions “because the defects were numerous and obvious and
that the Hances were directly involved with some of the defects,
including the installation of the electrical system for the smoke
53
detectors and repairing a window in the Gradjelicks’ apartment.”

45. Id.
46. Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 4.
47. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 228.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 228-29.
50. Id. at 229.
51. Id. at 228; Gradjelick v. Hance, 627 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001).
52. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 229. Among other improvements, the Hances
had the electrical system hardwired in 1997 and fire detectors installed in the
common hallway. See Appellants’ Brief, at 3.
53. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 230. The Appellants claimed that attaching the
smoke detectors eighteen inches below the ceiling, instead of at the ceiling level,
caused the detectors to untimely detect the smoke. See Appellants’ Brief at 7. It
was this improper installation that gave notice to the Hances of a dangerous
condition, thereby giving them constructive knowledge of the condition. Id.
(citing Wolvert v. Gustafson, 146 N.W.2d 172, 173 (Minn. 1966) for the
proposition that a landowner has constructive knowledge if the dangerous
condition is the result of the landowner’s actions).
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Moreover, Plaintiffs argued that Defendants knew or should have
known of these dangerous and hidden conditions because
Defendants owned the building both before and after the
54
conversion from office space to apartments.
55
In response, Defendants moved for summary judgment. The
Hances claimed that they lacked actual or constructive knowledge
that the rental property was unsafe or that any building or fire code
56
violations existed at the time of the fire. In support of their
position, the landlords cited a fire marshal’s annual report, dated
three months prior to the fire, which reported that the fire marshal
57
did not observe any code violations or hazards on the premises.
The landlords further argued that they lacked independent
knowledge of any hazards on the premises because they lived out of
state at the time of the fire and that residents never notified them
58
of any existing hazards. The Gradjelicks challenged summary
judgment by claiming, “the Hances could not rely on the
inspection report revealing no violations because the Hances were
59
directly involved with the defective conditions.”
B. The District Court’s Analysis
The landlords sought summary judgment in this case, arguing
that they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the fire code
60
violations. The issue before the court centered on whether there
were disputed issues of fact as to whether Defendant landlords
breached a duty owed to Plaintiffs that was the proximate cause of
61
Mr. Gradjelick’s injuries. The court ultimately found no genuine
54. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 5 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn.,
Sept. 18, 2000).
55. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 229.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 229-30. The city of Excelsior adopted the 1997 Uniform Fire Code
in 1998. Id. The fire marshal stated that the “city interprets the code to require
that nonconforming structural conditions in buildings that existed when the code
was adopted be corrected only upon commencement of new construction.” Id.
The marshal also stated that “he looks for conditions that can be corrected
without construction activity.” Id. When the fire marshal inspected the landlord’s
building three months before the fire, he found “no code violations that could be
corrected without construction activity and issued the multiple dwellings permit.”
Id. Additionally, the fire marshal “prepared a one-page summary of his inspection
in which he indicated ‘No Hazards Observed.’” Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 229.
61. Id. at 230.
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issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendants knew or
should have known of any code violations that may have existed on
62
their property. Even if the conditions existed as Plaintiffs alleged,
63
the fire marshal’s report failed to denote them. Defendants’
reliance on this report was construed to demonstrate a lack of
constructive knowledge of the code violations or any hazardous
64
conditions.
The district court therefore granted summary
judgment on the grounds that the landlord had reasonably relied
65
on an official building inspector’s report. Since the most recent
report stated there were no fire code violations at the apartment
building, the court found that the landlords lacked the requisite
66
notice to impose liability.
The district court ruling reiterated the general rule that
landlords are “not liable to tenants for damage caused by
defective conditions existing on the premises at the time of the
67
lease” absent one of the four exceptions of negligence per
68
se.
The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that
Defendants knew or should have known of any fire code violations,
which was a “crucial element to the plaintiff’s claim under
69
Minnesota law.”
The district court’s decision relied heavily on Bills v. Willow
Run I Apartments, which held that if a landlord or owner reasonably
relies on a state building inspection report, the landlord cannot be
70
held negligent per se for an uncited violation of that code. The
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 8 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn.,
Sept. 18, 2000) (citing Oakland v. Stenlund, 420 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) and Broughton v. Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
68. Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 9 (citing Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at
135); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 10.
70. Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1996).
Bills was injured when he fell on an exterior landing outside his apartment
building. Id. at 693-94. Plaintiff sued the building owner alleging the handrails
were in violation of the Uniform Building Code and this violation was a proximate
cause of his injuries. Id. at 694. The building inspector had inspected the landing
prior to the accident, which led the district court to rule that Plaintiff had failed to
show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged
defective condition. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the landlord
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district court found the Bills case factually similar to the case before
71
it.
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded in Bills that
landlords lack actual notice of a code violation when they
72
reasonably rely on an inspection report.
The district court
followed the precedent established by Bills and found that the
landlords did not have a duty to re-inspect the building after the
fire marshal’s inspection report and the issuance of the multiple
73
dwellings permit. The district court granted summary judgment
based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that Defendants knew or
should have known of the alleged violations as required by the Bills
74
decision.
C. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
75
district court. According to the decision, a landowner relying on
an official inspection report lacks constructive knowledge of code
violations and, therefore, cannot be liable in an ordinary
negligence action or in an action based on a negligence per se
76
theory.
The heart of Plaintiffs’ appeal was that the district court
applied the wrong legal standard in granting Defendants’ motion
77
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued that while Bills may
relieve the landlords from liability under a negligence per se
theory, it did not preclude a separate analysis under ordinary
78
79
negligence. The court of appeals disagreed.
The court interpreted the Bills decision as a modification of
80
the negligence per se doctrine in relation to landlord/tenant law.
The court of appeals stated that the supreme court had adopted a
standard that linked negligence per se and “common law
landlord/tenant standards [finding liability when the
landlord/landowner knew or should have known of a danger] into
reasonably relied upon the inspection report. Id.
71. Compare id. at 694-95, with Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 11.
72. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 695.
73. Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 11.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Gradjelick v. Hance, 627 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 712.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 713.
80. Id.
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81

one that defines a fair and just result.” In addition, the court
rejected Plaintiff’s argument that a separate analysis must occur
stating: “[w]e are unable to articulate a principled distinction
between per se and common law negligence theories for the
82
purposes of this analysis.”
In other words, according to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, if “the facts alleged failed to fulfill the
knowledge requirement under negligence per se theory, identical
83
facts asserted as common law negligence likewise fail.”
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Gradjelicks appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
stating that the lower courts applied an erroneous legal standard
and that genuine issues of fact were in dispute with respect to the
84
landlords’ knowledge of defective conditions.
Apparently
agreeing, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded
85
the case. Although the supreme court did not find fault with the
lower courts’ analysis with respect to negligence per se, the justices
remanded the case given the failure to apply the correct legal
86
standard to the separate ordinary negligence claim.
The supreme court took issue with the trial court’s
interpretation of Bills and its failure to consider the elements of
87
common law negligence in a separate analysis. According to the
Bills decision, actual or constructive knowledge of the code
violation is still a required element in a negligence per se claim
based on such violations, but this knowledge is not a required
88
element in a common law negligence claim. Instead, under the
hidden and dangerous condition exception to the general standard
of landlord liability, plaintiffs must show a landlord’s actual or
constructive knowledge of the hidden and dangerous condition, which
89
may or may not be a code violation. The practical effect of this
ruling is that the liability standards for ordinary negligence and for
90
negligence per se should be kept separate in the analysis of a case.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002).
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 234.
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Indeed, the court noted, “separate analysis is necessary under each
91
theory because the elements are different.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court also found that the district
court “failed to consider other exceptions upon which landlord
liability can be founded in ordinary negligence, including the
92
‘common area’ and ‘negligent repair’ exceptions.” Neither of
these exceptions requires actual or constructive knowledge of a
93
code violation. Additionally, a claim for ordinary negligence
requires only the elements of duty, breach, causation and
94
damages. The supreme court emphasized that a defendant is
entitled to summary judgment “when the record reflects a
complete lack of proof on any of the four essential elements of the
claim: (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty,
(3) an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty being the proximate
95
cause of the injury.” Actual or constructive notice of a code
96
violation does not enter into the analysis.
The court’s opinion found that the lower courts had erred in
97
interpreting and applying the Bills decision. The court concluded
that the Bills case should be applied to code violations only under a
98
negligence per se analysis. However, the court noted that the Bills
case did not mandate that code violations must only be analyzed
99
under a negligence per se theory.
Instead, analyses under
91. Id. Compare Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn.
1996) (articulating that a landlord will not be held liable for negligence per se
unless the plaintiff can show:
(1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of the code
violation;
(2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the
violation;
(3) the injury suffered was the kind the Code was meant to prevent;
and
(4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury or damage.)
with Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995) (stating the requisite
elements of negligence as the existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, an
injury, and the breach of duty being the proximate cause of the injury).
92. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 233.
93. Id.
94. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982).
95. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 230 (citing Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d
398, 401 (Minn. 1995)).
96. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 233.
97. Id. at 232.
98. Id. at 234. Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 693 (Minn.
1996).
99. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 234; Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 693.
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negligence per se according to Bills and ordinary common law
negligence are both available in landlord liability cases when code
100
violations are alleged.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE GRADJELICK DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly reversed both the
district court and the court of appeals in a decision that could
affect the future of landlord/tenant law in at least two ways. First, it
is now clear that two theories of landlord liability exist in a
negligence action when code violations are alleged. Second,
depending upon the interpretation given, the decision could either
signal a new direction for the Minnesota Supreme Court in
landlord liability cases, one which expands recovery options for
tenants, or as merely clarifying existing causes of action.
The clarification of the required analysis in negligence actions
involving housing code violations is perhaps the most important
result of the Gradjelick case. The supreme court was careful to
delineate the knowledge requirements under negligence per se
and common law negligence as that seemed to be an area of
confusion for the lower courts. While actual or constructive
knowledge of code violations is required under a negligence per se
101
claim based on building code violations under Bills, actual or
constructive knowledge of a code violation is not a required
102
element in an ordinary negligence claim.
Rather, under the
hidden dangerous condition exception to general standards of
landlord liability set forth in Breimhorst v. Beckman, plaintiffs are
required to show a landlord’s actual or constructive knowledge of a
103
hidden, dangerous condition. As the Minnesota Supreme Court
noted, hidden and dangerous conditions may include, but are not
104
limited to, code violations.
In contrast to the finding of the court of appeals, the supreme
court made a principled distinction between per se and common
law negligence theories. Knowledge of code violations only applies
105
in negligence per se cases, which was clearly the situation in Bills.
When code violations are alleged, the negligence per se analysis
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 234.
Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 695.
Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982).
227 Minn. 409, 419, 35 N.W.2d 719, 726 (1949).
Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 233.
Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 693.
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cannot supplant the separate analysis required under ordinary
106
negligence law in evaluating claims by tenants against landlords.
In short, the Gradjelick decision allowed the Minnesota Supreme
Court to clarify the necessary analytical process in negligence cases
where housing code violations are alleged. Furthermore, the
decision also enabled the court to prevent the continued
107
misapplication of the Bills decision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruling follows the general
108
trend of other states as well. The Supreme Court of Delaware
106. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 232.
107. See, e.g., In re Shigellosis Litigation, 647 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
108. See generally Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Alaska 1994) (holding
that the traditional common law rule that a landlord is generally not liable for
dangerous conditions in leased premises no longer applies in view of the
legislature’s enactment of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act);
Gore v. People’s Sav. Bank, 665 A.2d 1341, 1348 (Conn. 1995) (“[a]lthough the
common law imposes on landlords only a duty to maintain in a reasonably safe
condition those areas of their premises over which they exercise control, statutes
may impose on landlords additional duties or obligations.”); Mansur v. Eubanks,
401 So.2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981) (holding that after the tenant takes possession,
the landlord has a continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous
defective conditions upon notice of their existence by the tenant, unless waived by
the tenant); Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (Idaho 1984) (adopting the rule
that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances); Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Mass. 1980) (holding
that landlords must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm); Houston v. York, 755 So.2d 495, 501 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999) (making a landlord subject to tort liability merely requires him to act as a
reasonable landlord under the circumstances of the case, but the tenant would
still be required to show duty, breach, causation, and damages, and the landlord
would be entitled to raise the standard tort defenses, such as contributory
negligence, unforeseeability or intervening cause); Lenz v. Ridgewood Assocs., 284
S.E.2d 702, 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a violation of statute
determining rights, obligations, and remedies under rental agreement for
dwelling unit does not constitute negligence per se, and the common law
standards of ordinary and reasonable care in such cases, violation of statute being
only evidence of negligence, are left intact); Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290, 1292
(Nev. 1985) (holding that landlords, as other persons, must exercise reasonable
care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm); Shump v. First
Continental-Robinwood Assoc., 644 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Ohio 1994) (“[t]he legal
duty that a landlord owes a tenant is not determined by the common-law
classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser under the law of premises
liability; instead, a landlord’s liability to a tenant is determined by a landlord’s
common-law immunity from liability and any exceptions to that immunity that a
court or a legislative body has created.”); Favreau v. Miller, 591 A.2d 68, 72 (Vt.
1991) (holding that landlords may be held liable for exposing their tenants to
unreasonable risks of harm in the leased premises, whether or not they retain
“control” of the dangerous condition); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284
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ruled that a plaintiff may pursue their claims under both ordinary
109
negligence and negligence per se. The Delaware court stated
that the landlord in its case was “mistaken in its argument that the
Landlord Tenant Code precludes claims for ordinary
110
negligence.”
This decision may be viewed as a departure from the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s generally conservative approach to
111
112
landlord liability. Unlike their decisions in Funchess and Meyer,
this opinion appears to be moving toward providing additional
theories under which an injured tenant may recover. Some may
interpret the decision as marking a new direction in landlord
liability because it expands (rather than retracts) the theories of
recovery available to an injured tenant. On the other hand, the
decision could be interpreted as a mere corrective measure, which
prevented further misapplication of the Bills decision and clarified
the standards for negligence cases involving housing code
violations.
The decision should be viewed as a corrective measure and a
necessary outcome to clarify the current state of landlord liability in
Minnesota. The supreme court did not add a new cause of action
to the area of landlord liability; it merely articulated the difference
between existing claims. Indeed, were the Minnesota Supreme
Court to have ruled the other way, it would have only further
muddied the waters in landlord liability law by confusing cases
involving code violations with cases where hidden, dangerous
conditions are alleged.
VI. CONCLUSION
113

While at first glance, Gradjelick v. Hance may seem to provide
tenants with a new way to defeat a landlord’s defense of reliance on
inspection reports in a negligence case, it does not. Rather, the
N.W.2d 55, 61 (Wis. 1979) (holding when a person lawfully on the premises is
injured as a result of the landlord’s negligence in maintaining the premises, he is
entitled to recover from the landlord under general negligence principles).
Compare Webster v. Heim, 399 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (refusing to
adopt the rule of reasonable care in place of the common law rule of non-liability
of landlords for injuries to tenants).
109. New Haverford P’ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 797 (Del. 2001).
110. Id. at 798.
111. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001).
112. Meyer v. Parkin, 350 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1984).
113. 646 N.W.2d 225.
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case is more likely to be viewed as a mere clarification of the causes
of action that already existed. Though the Minnesota Supreme
Court remanded the case to the district court for further findings,
it suggested that the court had applied the correct legal standard
114
with respect to the negligence per se theory. However, it wanted
the district court to conduct a separate analysis under common law
115
negligence.
Landlords may still argue they lack constructive knowledge of
any code violation by relying on fire marshal inspection reports
that do not turn up any such code violations and thus defeat a
negligence per se claim. However, the supreme court has made
clear that they could not successfully use the same argument to
defeat a separate common law negligence claim if the tenants can
point to a separate duty that was breached.

114.
115.

Id. at 235.
Id.
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